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We examine the effect of mandatory International Financial Reporting 
Standards (‘IFRS’) adoption on firms’ information environment. We find that 
after mandatory IFRS adoption consensus forecast errors decrease for firms 
that mandatorily adopt IFRS relative to forecast errors of other firms. We also 
find decreasing forecast errors for voluntary adopters, but this effect is smaller 
and not robust. Moreover, we show that the magnitude of the forecast errors 
decrease is associated with the firm-specific differences between local GAAP 
and IFRS. Exploiting individual analyst level data and isolating settings where 
investors would benefit more from either increased comparability or higher 
quality information, we document that the improvement in the information 
environment is driven both by information and comparability effects. These 
results are robust to variations in the measurement of information environment 
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DOES MANDATORY IFRS ADOPTION IMPROVE  




According to proponents of International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS), publicly traded companies must apply a single set of high quality 
accounting standards, in the preparation of their consolidated financial 
statements, in order to contribute to better functioning capital markets 
(Quigley [2007]). IFRS has the potential to facilitate cross-border 
comparability, increase reporting transparency, decrease information costs, 
reduce information asymmetry and thereby increase the liquidity, 
competitiveness and efficiency of markets (Ball [2006], Choi and Meek 
[2005]).1 
These potential benefits rely on the presumption that mandatory IFRS 
adoption provides superior information to market participants and/or increased 
accounting comparability compared to previous accounting regimes. However, 
to-date there is little and often conflicting empirical evidence that this is the 
case. Moreover, while all of these potential benefits provide a persuasive 
argument for IFRS adoption, the costs associated with such a transition cannot 
be ignored. For example, Ball [2006] notes that the fair value orientation of 
IFRS could add volatility to financial statements, in the form of both good and 
bad information, the latter consisting of noise which arises from inherent 
estimation error and possible managerial manipulation.  




Whether harmonisation will actually be achieved is also currently up 
for debate with many commentators arguing that the same accounting 
standards can be implemented differently (Kvaal and Nobes [2010]; Schipper 
[2005]). In the absence of suitable enforcement mechanisms, real convergence 
and harmonisation is unlikely, resulting in diminished comparability (Ball 
[2006]). Cultural, political and business differences may also continue to 
impose significant obstacles in the progress towards this single global 
financial communication system, since a single set of accounting standards 
cannot reflect the differences in national business practices arising from 
differences in institutions and cultures (Armstrong et al. [2009]; Soderstrom 
and Sun [2007]). Incentives might also continue to dominate the effect of any 
standards (Bradshaw and Miller [2007]; Lang et al. [2006]). Even with high 
quality standards, such as IFRS, there is still a risk of relatively lower quality 
accounting if firms have incentives and opportunities to manipulate (Leuz et 
al. [2003]). 
In this paper we investigate what attributes of IFRS, if any, cause the 
improvement in the information environment for firms. Prior and 
contemporaneous studies investigating the impact of IFRS on analysts’ 
forecasting ability has generally found that analyst forecast errors have 
significantly reduced following voluntary adoption of IFRS (Ashbaugh and 
Pincus, [2001]; Ernstberger et al. [2008]; Hodgdon et al. [2008]; Bae et al. 
[2008]) and, for certain groups under mandatory adoption of IFRS (Wang et 
al. [2008]; Byard et al. [2009]; Preiato et al. [2009]; Cotter et al. [2010]; Tan 




et al. [2009]; Glaum et al. [2010]). However, it is difficult to establish from 
these results the actual causes for such improvements - what is it about IFRS 
adoption that increases forecast accuracy? In this paper we specifically 
consider and directly test whether this observed benefit is due to IFRS 
providing higher quality information and greater comparability or simply that 
IFRS affords managers greater opportunities to manage their earnings and 
hence meet analysts’ forecasts.  
We find that, following the transition to IFRS, mandatory adopters’ 
forecast accuracy and other measures of the quality of the information 
environment increase significantly more relative to non-adopters and 
voluntary adopters. Unlike prior studies we do not find that voluntary adopters 
benefit significantly more from mandating IFRS relative to mandatory 
adopters (Daske et al. [2008]). To isolate the effect of mandatory adoption we 
control for time-varying and persistent unobservable firm characteristics that 
affect forecast accuracy. We also control for industry-year and country-year 
effects to mitigate any industry and country-wide changes in forecast 
accuracy. The results are robust to alternative dependent variables, samples of 
control firms, and forecast horizon choices. 
We also find, by holding constant any information effects of IFRS and 
allowing comparability effects to vary, that the increase in forecast accuracy is 
driven in part by comparability benefits of IFRS. To test this directly we 
consider three groups of analysts. First, analysts covering firms that report 
under a single local GAAP (for example UK GAAP) before mandatory 




adoption and after mandatory adoption some firms switch to IFRS but other 
firms continue to report under local GAAP. For these analysts, we expect 
accounting comparability to decrease. Second, analysts covering firms that 
report under a single local GAAP before mandatory adoption and after 
mandatory adoption all firms switch to IFRS. For these analysts, we expect 
accounting comparability to remain the same. Third, analysts covering firms 
that report under multiple local GAAP (for example some firms use UK 
GAAP and other firms Spanish GAAP) before mandatory adoption and after 
mandatory adoption all firms switch to IFRS. For these analysts, we expect 
accounting comparability to increase. We expect that, if information effects 
exist for mandatory adopters, they are going to benefit all three groups of 
analysts. To eliminate the possibility that an analyst’s choice to change firm 
coverage affects the results we include in the analysis only mandatory 
adopters that the analyst is covering both before and after mandatory adoption. 
Consistent with a comparability effect forecast accuracy improves more for 
analysts with portfolios that move from Local GAAP to IFRS compared to 
Local GAAP to Multiple GAAP, and even more for analysts with portfolios 
that move from Multiple GAAP to IFRS. 
Furthermore we find, by holding constant any comparability effects of 
IFRS and allowing informational effects to vary, that the increase in forecast 
accuracy is driven in part by information benefits of IFRS. We test this 
directly by considering analysts covering firms that report under multiple local 
GAAP before mandatory adoption and after mandatory adoption all firms 




switch to IFRS. From the portfolios of those analysts we select voluntary and 
mandatory adopters that the analyst covers both before and after mandatory 
adoption. We expect that if IFRS increases information quality then forecast 
accuracy should improve more for mandatory than for voluntary adopters. We 
also expect that comparability effects will be present for both mandatory and 
voluntary adopters for these analysts. We find results consistent with an 
information effect. For this set of analyst-firm pairs, forecast accuracy 
improves more for mandatory adopters. 
In addition, we find that forecast accuracy improves more for firms 
with accounting treatments that diverge the most from IFRS, providing some 
confidence that it is IFRS adoption that causes this change. This may reflect 
that those firms with the largest deviation of accounting practice from IFRS 
benefit most from comparability and information benefits (Horton and 
Serafeim [2010]; Beuselinck et al. [2010]; Brochet et al. [2011]).  
However, an alternative explanation of this result is that the 
reconciliation component captures the increased opportunities for managers, 
using the additional accruals adjustments afforded to them by IFRS 
implementation, to manipulate their earnings to meet or beat analysts’ 
forecasts. We do not find evidence consistent with this explanation. Moreover, 
when we consider whether the increase in forecast accuracy is driven 
primarily by mandatory adopters with more opportunities to manipulate their 
earnings (firms with larger accruals or firms that analysts do not forecast cash 
flows), we do not find any evidence in support of this claim. 




We make a number of contributions to the existing literature. First, our 
study contributes to the literature on the consequences of disclosure by 
examining the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption (Daske et al. [2008], Horton 
and Serafeim [2010]) on analysts (Ashbaugh and Pincus [2001], Wang et al. 
[2008]; Byard et al. [2010]; Cotter et al. [2010]; Tan et al. [2010]) and thus on 
the information environment (Lang et al. [2003]). We also add to the previous 
literature by documenting a larger improvement in the information 
environment for mandatory adopters relative to voluntary adopters and non-
adopters (Daske et al. [2008]), and find that this improvement is associated to 
the firm’s earnings reconciliation adjustment. 
We contribute to the growing body of literature that directly 
investigates the comparability benefits (Beuselinck et al. [2007]; Daske et al. 
[2008]; DeFond et al. [2009]; DeFranco [2009]; Henry et al. [2009]; Barth et 
al. [2010]; Kvaal and Nobes [2010]; Cascino and Gassen  [2010]; Beneish et 
al. [2010]; Lang et al. [2010]) and information benefits (Ashbaugh and Pincus 
[2001]; Hung and Subrananyam [2007]; Barth et al. [2008]; Li [2010]; 
Prather-Kinsey et al. [2008]; Horton and Serafeim [2010]; Beuselinck et al. 
[2010]; Landsman et al. [2010]; Kim and Li [2010]; Daske et al. [2008]; 
Daske [2006]; Atwood et al. [2010]) of IFRS, by providing evidence that the 
increase in forecast accuracy appears to be driven both by information and 
comparability effects. We also contribute to the debate on the role of 
incentives, specifically whether managers exercise their judgement 
opportunistically when implementing IFRS (Leuz et al. [2003]; Ball et al. 




[2003]; Ahmed et al. [2010]; Christensen et al. [2008]; Paananen [2008]; 
Paananen and Lin [2008]; Jeanjean and Stolowy [2008]; Ahmed et al. [2010]; 
Chen et al. [2010]) by providing evidence that the increase in forecast 
accuracy appears not to be driven by manipulation. 
Before proceeding we need to highlight a number of caveats. First, as 
in any study that exploits time-series variation from an exogenous event, it is 
hard to unambiguously attribute causality to the observed effects. We accept 
that it is possible that correlated omitted variables are driving the results, 
although we have tried to carefully isolate the effect from IFRS adoption. For 
example, factors that affect the infrastructure of financial reporting, e.g., 
improved auditor training related to IFRS, additional analysts training, etc. 
that are potentially correlated with the adoption of IFRS. However, we attempt 
to isolate the economic effect of IFRS reporting by considering all three 
categories of firms and by using several different identification strategies. 
Second, similar to previous research (Lang and Lundholm [1996]; Healy et al. 
[1999]), we rely on the analyst forecast characteristics to measure changes in 
the information environment. To the extent that these proxies are not 
appropriate, one needs to be careful on how to interpret our findings.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews 
the literature and presents the hypotheses. Section 3 describes our research 
design. Section 4 presents our sample selection and statistics. Section 5 
presents our results and section 6 concludes. 
 




2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND MOTIVATION 
2.1. Background: IFRS adoption 
Countries with prominent capital markets, such as Australia, European Union 
constituents, Hong Kong, Philippines, and South Africa, require publicly 
traded companies (with certain exceptions) to present consolidated financial 
statements in conformity with IFRS for each financial year starting on or after 
1 January 2005. Other countries, such as Japan, have decided to adopt IFRS in 
the future and already allow companies to voluntarily report under IFRS. The 
SEC has also scheduled a timeline of transition to IFRS for US firms that want 
to start reporting under IFRS. 
 While mandatory adoption of IFRS was widespread in 2005 there are 
still firms that follow alternative accounting standards. In countries such as the 
US, Canada, Mexico, China, Malaysia and Brazil, firms are not allowed to 
report under IFRS. Whilst in other countries certain firms are exempt from 
IFRS adoption. For example, in the UK, companies listed in the Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM) are not subject to the EU IAS Regulation. The AIM 
has adopted a rule that requires AIM firms to submit IFRS financial statements 
for periods beginning on or after 1 January 2007, although voluntary adoption 
is allowed.  Swiss firms2 that are not multinationals are also exempt from 
IFRS compliance. These companies may continue to use Swiss GAAP, or they 
may choose IFRS or US GAAP (Deloitte [2008]). In addition, the IAS 
Regulation is only applicable to consolidated accounts and many investment 
trusts that only publish parent accounts are by their very nature exempt.  




 Companies reporting under IFRS can be split into either voluntary or 
mandatory adopters. The first group includes all the companies that adopted 
IFRS before 2005, while the latter group consists of firms that were forced to 
adopt IFRS. As a result, currently there are three distinct groups of firms that 
exhibit different attitudes towards IFRS: ‘non–IFRS adopters’ that exploit the 
exemptions and choose not to report under IFRS or that are listed in countries 
where IFRS is not allowed; ‘mandatory adopters’ that only adopt when they 
are forced to comply; and ‘voluntary adopters’ that choose to comply with 
IFRS in the period before the regulatory rules demanded IFRS adoption.  
Although earlier studies on ‘voluntary adopters’ provide valuable 
insights as to the effect of IFRS disclosure, these results may not be 
generalizable in the current mandatory setting (Daske et al. [2008]; Horton and 
Serafeim [2010]). We expect any effects from IFRS mandatory adoption to be 
different from those documented for voluntary IFRS adopters (Ashbaugh and 
Pincus [2001]; Bae et al. [2008]; Guan et al. [2006]), since the former group is 
essentially forced to adopt IFRS, compared to the latter that chooses to adopt. 
For example, past research finds that the decision to voluntarily adopt IFRS 
reporting is only one element of a broader strategy that increases a firm’s 
overall commitment to transparency (Daske et al. [2008]; Leuz and Verrecchia 
[2000]). Thus, any effects around voluntary IFRS adoptions cannot be 
attributed solely to IFRS compliance. Moreover, under a mandatory setting 
firms are more likely to be affected by reporting externalities i.e. disclosure by 
one firm being useful in valuing other firms through intra-industry information 




transfers. In contrast, under a voluntary setting there are fewer firms disclosing 
and therefore such externalities may be moderate. Indeed positive externalities 
are often used as a rationale in favor of disclosure regulation.  
 
2.2. Information environment and research analysts 
Our approach follows prior research by Lang and Lundholm [1996], Healy et 
al. [1999], Gebhardt et al. [2001], and Lang et al. [2003] and uses the 
characteristics of analyst forecasts as a proxy for the information environment. 
In particular, we focus on the accuracy of analyst forecasts. Previous studies 
suggest inter alia, that more accurate forecasts indicate a firm with a better 
information environment. Lang and Lundholm [1996] find that firms with 
better disclosure have lower analyst forecast errors. Hope [2003] finds that 
countries with better disclosure policies and enforcement have higher analyst 
forecast accuracy. Similar to this prior literature, we view forecast errors as 
indicative of, but not necessarily the cause of, changes in a firm’s information 
environment.  
 
2.3. Analyst Forecasts and IFRS 
The studies investigating the effects of voluntary adoption of IFRS find an 
improvement in the information environment of analysts (Ashbaugh and 
Pincus, [2001]; Ernstberger et al. [2008]; Hodgdon et al. [2008]; Bae et al. 
[2008]), with the exception of Daske [2005]. In contrast, recent studies 
investigating the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on the accuracy of 




analysts’ forecasts have produced inconclusive results. The overall findings 
suggest improvements in forecast accuracy for some EU and Australian firms 
post-IFRS (Wang et al. [2008]; Byard et al. [2009]; Preiato et al. [2009]; 
Cotter et al. [2010]; Tan et al. [2009]). Byard et al. [2009] find an increase in 
the forecast accuracy but only for those firms that were domiciled in countries 
with both strong enforcement regimes and domestic accounting standards that 
differed significantly from IFRS. While Tan et al. [2009] find that forecast 
accuracy improves post-IFRS for foreign analysts, but not for domestic 
analysts. However, both Cotter et al. [2010] and Tan et al. [2009] were unable 
to find any association with increased accuracy and GAAP differences 
between the firm’s home GAAP and IFRS.3 Moreover, Preiato et al. [2009] 
was unable to find any association with the increased forecast accuracy and a 
legal enforcement index.  
A number of recent studies directly test possible causes for such 
increases in analyst accuracy following IFRS. For example, Glaum et al. 
[2009] investigates whether IFRS provides greater quality disclosure and 
thereby increases the forecast accuracy. They find that although the quality of 
disclosure improves, this explains only a small proportion of the overall 
improvement in forecast accuracy. Cheong et al. [2010] and Chalmers [2010] 
investigate the effect on analysts’ forecasts following the new IFRS 
accounting rules for intangibles. Cheong et al. [2010] find intangibles 
capitalized post-IFRS are associated with forecast accuracy whilst Chalmers 
[2010] finds the declassification of intangibles post-IFRS reduces accuracy. 




Therefore, to-date it is still unclear exactly what attributes of IFRS reporting is 
driving this increase in analysts’ forecast accuracy. The two most frequently 
claimed benefits associated with IFRS adoption is an increase in accounting 
comparability and an increase in information quality. 
 
2.4. Comparability 
A major potential benefit from the global move towards IFRS is an increase in 
accounting comparability. Indeed, the SEC identifies comparability of 
financial information to investors as a key benefit of moving from US GAAP 
to IFRS. However, many question the potential for IFRS to increase 
comparability because the same accounting standards can be implemented 
differently and in the absence of suitable enforcement mechanisms, real 
convergence and harmonization is unlikely (Ball, [2006]). 
To-date there is little research to support the argument that IFRS has 
indeed increased comparability. Prior research shows that as a firm’s GAAP 
moves closer to foreign investors’ or analysts’ home GAAP it reduces the 
home bias (Bradshaw et al. [2004]; Covrig et al. [2007]; Yu [2010]), and 
improves the efficiency of information intermediaries (Bae et al. [2007]; 
Bradshaw et al. [2010]). For example, Tan et al. [2010] find that post 
mandatory IFRS adoption foreign analysts’ following increases significantly 
more for those firms who had the greatest level of GAAP divergence. Using 
the same divergence proxy as Tan et al. [2010], Yu [2010] finds mandatory 




IFRS adoption increases cross-border equity holdings for those firms where 
the divergence was greatest prior to IFRS.  
These findings appear at first to support the argument that IFRS adoption 
increases comparability, but arguably what these studies actually capture is 
familiarity rather than comparability (Bradshaw et al. [2004]).  A number of 
recent studies have attempted to directly test whether IFRS adoption increases 
comparability. The results are mixed. DeFond et al. [2009], measuring 
comparability in terms of an increase in uniformity (Bielstein et al. [2007]), 
find that mandatory IFRS adoption results in a greater increase in foreign 
investment among firms in countries with strong implementation credibility 
and an increase in comparability.4 Daske et al. [2008] find capital market 
benefits arising from mandating IFRS are most pronounced for firms who 
voluntarily adopted IFRS, suggesting possible comparability benefits.  
However, they conducted several tests but were unable to provide statistical 
support for this argument.  
Other studies argue and find that cultural, political and business 
differences continue to impose significant obstacles in the progress towards 
this single global financial communication system, since a single set of 
accounting standards cannot reflect differences in national business practices 
arising from differences in institutions and cultures (Armstrong et al. [2009]; 
Soderstrom and Sun [2007]; Kvaal and Nobes [2010]; Beuselinck et al. 
[2007]; Henry et al. [2009]).  Cascino and Gassen [2010] find that pre-IFRS 
practices continue after mandatory adoption, whereby some German firms 




‘bend’ IFRS towards their local GAAP, whilst Italian firms tend to ‘label 
adopt’ IFRS. Beneish et al. [2010] find that mandatory IFRS adoption 
increases cross-border debt but not equity investments, suggesting that IFRS 
provides no comparability benefits. Lang et al. [2010] find that accounting 
comparability does not improve for IFRS adopters relative to a control group 
of non-adopters. They conclude that there is little evidence that IFRS increases 
true cross-country comparability or the ability of analysts to learn from inter-
firm comparisons.   
Thus, the empirical question remains as to whether the improvement in the 
information environment of analysts documented in prior literature is due to 
an increase in comparability. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
 
Ha1: Mandatory IFRS adoption provides comparability benefits and as a 
result affects analyst earnings forecast accuracy for firms adopting IFRS 
mandatorily. 
 
2.5 Information Benefits 
Past research has shown that higher quality reporting reduces adverse selection 
in securities markets (Welker [1995]; Healy et al. [1999]; Lambert et al. 
[2007]), reduces cost of capital (Botosan [1997]; Hail and Leuz [2006]), and 
improves the efficiency of information intermediaries (Land and Lundholm 
[1996]; Healy et al. [1999]; Hope [2003]). IFRS is considered to be a high 




quality set of standards providing valuable information to investors (Ashbaugh 
and Pincus [2001]; Hung and Subrananyam [2007]).   
The research to date provides mixed evidence as to whether IFRS numbers 
are of a higher quality relative to those associated with the application of 
domestic GAAP (Leuz and Wysocki [2008]). Barth et al. [2008] find that 
firms’ reporting quality increases following IFRS compliance for voluntary 
adopters. Li [2010] find that a firm’s cost of capital reduces following 
mandatory IFRS, but only for firms from strong legal enforcement countries 
(see also Prather-Kinsey et al. [2008]). Horton and Serafeim [2010] find that 
IFRS reconciliations provide new information to investors even for firms that 
have already reported their performance under a high quality accounting 
regime (UK GAAP). Beuselinck et al. [2010] show that stock price 
synchronicity decreases after mandatory IFRS adoption but the effect is 
temporary. Landsman et al. [2010] find that the information content of 
earnings announcement increases after adopting IFRS mandatorily, but only 
when using abnormal return volatility to proxy for information content rather 
than abnormal volume. Similarly, Kim and Li [2010] find following 
mandatory IFRS an increase in intra-industry information transfer, particularly 
for those announcers whose local GAAP diverged significantly from IFRS.5 
Various other studies fail to find strong evidence that IFRS improves the 
information set of investors and find limited or no capital market benefits for 
mandatory adopters. Daske et al. [2008] show that capital market benefits 
around mandatory adoption of IFRS are unlikely to exist primarily because of 




IFRS adoption. Daske [2006] finds no evidence that IFRS adoption decreases 
a firm’s cost of capital. Atwood et al. [2010] find that earnings reported under 
IFRS are no more or less persistent and are no more or less associated with 
future cash flows than earnings reported under local GAAP. Atwood et al. 
[2010] suggest that the documented increase in analyst forecast accuracy 
following IFRS is not the result of differences in the underlying persistence of 
those earnings.   
Thus, the empirical question remains as to whether the improvement in the 
information environment of analysts documented in prior literature is due to 
an increase in information quality. This leads to our second hypothesis: 
Ha2: Mandatory IFRS adoption provides information quality benefits and 
as a result affects analyst earnings forecast accuracy for firms adopting IFRS 
mandatorily. 
2.6. Incentives and Manipulation 
The effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on information quality and 
comparability is questionable if firms’ reporting incentives do not change to 
align with transparency. A stream of research argues that a firm’s reporting 
incentives, and not accounting standards, is the primary factor that determines 
the informativeness of accounting statements (Ball et al. [2000]). Ball and 
Shivakumar [2005] suggest that managers do exercise their discretion and 
judgment opportunistically (Leuz et al. [2003]; Ball et al. [2003]). 
Opponents of IFRS argue that IFRS has increased managerial flexibility 
and discretion especially due to the lack of implementation guidance and poor 




enforcement (Ahmed et al. [2010]; Ball et al. [2003]; Leuz et al. [2003]). 
Consistent with the importance of incentives, Christensen et al. [2008] find 
that incentives dominate standards in determining accounting quality around 
mandatory IFRS adoption. Paananen [2008] and Paananen and Lin [2008] 
both find a decrease in financial reporting quality, an increase in earnings 
management, and a reduction in timeliness of loss recognition in Germany 
following mandatory IFRS.  Jeanjean and Stolowy [2008] find no decline in 
the pervasiveness of earnings management in Austria and UK and find an 
increase in France. Both Ahmed et al. [2010] and Chen et al. [2010] find 
evidence of income smoothing and a reduction in timeliness of loss 
recognition following mandatory IFRS. However, contrary to Chen et al. 
[2010], Ahmed et al. [2010] also find a significant increase in aggressive 
reporting of some accruals and no reduction in the management of earnings 
towards a target. Surprisingly, Ahmed et al. [2010] find their results are more 
pronounced for firms from countries with a strong rule of law. 
Prior literature therefore suggests there are opportunities for earnings 
management following IFRS. Thus, the documented increase in analysts’ 
forecast accuracy could be a consequence of managers having more 
opportunities to manage their earnings towards analyst forecasts. Prior studies 
document the existence of firms managing earnings towards a target 
(Bannister and Newman [1996]; Degeorge et al. [1999]; Matsumoto [2000]; 
Abarbanell and Lehary [2003]; Hutton [2005]). This leads to our third 
hypothesis: 




Ha3: The increase in forecast accuracy following mandatory IFRS is 
associated with an increase in the opportunities for firms to manage earnings 
towards a target.  
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 Forecast Accuracy 
In order to test our three hypotheses we first need to verify whether the 
adoption of IFRS, for our sample of firms, increases the firm’s information 
environment. Specifically we test for differences in forecast errors before and 
after IFRS mandatory compliance for both mandatory and voluntary adopters.  
We include voluntary adopters following the results of Byard et al. [2009] and 
Daske et al. [2008]. Voluntary adopters, under this new mandatory setting, 
may benefit from positive externalities in terms of an increase in 
comparability and disclosure (Coffee [1984]; Lambert et al. [2007]; Daske et 
al. [2008]). Following the mandatory adoption, there is now a larger pool in 
which intra-industry information transfers could take place, providing 
additional information about the voluntary adopters and resulting in an 
improvement in the information environment (Foster [1980]; Ramnath [2002]; 
Gleason et al. [2008]). Moreover, disclosure theory suggests that an increase 
in mandatory disclosure is paralleled by an increase in the incentives to 
voluntary disclosure – i.e. there is a ‘race to the top’ (Dye [1986; 1990]), such 
that although disclosure is costly, voluntary adopters provide even more 
information to maintain the differential between the mandatory adopters. 




Unlike Byard et al. [2008] and consistent with the findings of Daske et 
al. [2008] we control for the impact of potentially confounding events using 
non-adopting firms as our control sample. Thus, any change in forecast 
accuracy for non-adopters will likely reflect the impact of concurrent 
economic and regulatory changes, but not the impact of mandatory IFRS 
adoption. I/B/E/S reports twelve consensus forecasts each year for a firm. We 
choose the consensus forecast that is calculated three months before fiscal 
year-end to ensure that analysts have adequate information generated by IFRS 
reporting to affect their forecast accuracy. We later use other consensus 
forecasts to assess the robustness of our results to the choice of forecast 





















     (1) 
We define FEit as the forecast error for firm i and year t. Forecast error is the 
absolute difference between actual earnings and consensus forecast deflated 
by absolute actual earnings.6  Voluntary IFRS is an indicator variable that 
takes the value of one for firms that adopted IFRS before IFRS was mandated. 
Mandatory IFRS is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for firms 
that adopted IFRS after IFRS was mandated. Mandatory is an indicator 
variable that captures the period after mandatory IFRS adoption. It takes a 
value of one for the period after 2005 (after 2003 for Singapore) and zero 




otherwise. β3 captures the effect on firms that did not adopt IFRS, β3 + β4 
captures the effect on firms that voluntarily adopted IFRS early and β3 + β5 
captures the effect on firms that adopted IFRS mandatorily. 
Model (1) includes only firms that have available data for periods both 
before and after the mandatory IFRS adoption. Previous research (Clement 
[1999]; Duru and Reeb [2002]; Bradshaw et al. [2010]) suggests various 
factors that might affect forecast errors. We use these variables as controls in 
the models. Control variables include 1) the level of absolute accruals, 2) 
analyst coverage, 3) the logarithm of the market value of the firm’s equity, 4) 
reporting negative income, 5) forecast horizon, defined as the number of days 
between the forecast’s issue date and the fiscal year end. We also include 
indicator variables for firms that report under US GAAP or for firms that trade 
an ADR in the US. We include country-year and industry-year fixed effects in 
model (1) to control for industry and country-wide time-varying effects. 
Moreover, we include firm fixed effects to control for persistent firm 
differences across the three groups of firms. We double cluster standard errors 
at the firm and at the year level to mitigate serial correlation within a firm or 
cross-correlation among firms within a year. 
To increase our confidence that it is IFRS adoption that causes the 
increase in forecast accuracy we also examine whether the firm-specific 
differences between IFRS and local GAAP earnings, captured in the firm’s 
reconciliation document, are associated with the change in forecast accuracy 
following mandatory IFRS. If IFRS adoption results in greater transparency, 




comparability and quality of accounting information then a priori those firms 
with the largest deviation of accounting practice from IFRS should have the 
most to gain from the transition to IFRS. Several papers have used 
reconciliation amounts as proxies for the incremental information content of 
IFRS disclosure (Horton and Serafeim [2010]; Beuselinck et al. [2010]; 
Brochet et al. [2011]) and find that indeed these larger reconciliation amounts 
have higher information content. 
Previous research investigating the mandatory adoption of IFRS (Tan 
et al. [2009]; Cotter et al. [2010]) have been unable to find any significant 
association with differences in accounting standards or reconciliation amounts 
and forecast accuracy.7 This lack of documented association could be because 
analysts for the first few years of IFRS adoption might find it hard to 
understand and forecast fundamentals because of their limited experience with 
IFRS, and/or large reconciliation adjustments reflect the higher levels of 
complexity and therefore are more difficult to forecast, and/or because of the 
break in the historical time-series of earnings (Aubert and Dumontier [2009]; 
Acker et al. [2002]; Cuijpers and Bujink [2005]). Although, Tan et al. [2009] 
find, even for analysts with prior IFRS experience, no association with 
forecast accuracy and their index of accounting differences. 
We use, as a proxy for the differences between local GAAP and IFRS, 
a firm-level measure by obtaining the actual reported reconciliation 
component between IFRS and local GAAP earnings.8 This is available 
because firms were required in the first year of adoption to report the 




reconciliations between their last reported local GAAP accounts and IFRS. 
Therefore, we use the absolute difference between the firm’s local GAAP 
earnings for 2004 and the reconciled IFRS earnings for 2004, as a percentage 
of absolute local GAAP earnings.9 
3.2. Comparability and/or information effects 
To investigate whether the effect of IFRS on analysts’ forecasts is due to IFRS 
providing a richer information set through greater transparency, and/or IFRS 
providing greater comparability we need to disentangle these two effects. 
Therefore we segment the analyst sample in such a way to hold relatively 
constant the information effects, and allow comparability effects to vary, or by 
holding the comparability effect constant and allowing information effects to 
vary. Research analysts are an ideal setting to separate comparability and 
information effects because the set of stocks that they analyze is publicly 
observable. Embedded in the analysis of this section is the assumption that 
analysts focus on specific stocks and therefore a change in accounting 
standards might increase, decrease or have no effect on accounting 
comparability for an individual analyst, depending on the composition of the 
analyst’s portfolio. 
3.2.1. Comparability Effects 
To test for the possibility of comparability effects of IFRS adoption we split 
the analyst sample into three groups. The first group is Local GAAP to IFRS 
that includes only analysts with portfolios consisting of firms that followed a 
single local GAAP prior to IFRS and then all switched to IFRS. For example, 




an analyst follows only firms whose financial statements use Spanish GAAP 
until 2004 and then they all switch to IFRS. We believe that for this subset of 
analysts comparability effects are negligible because these analysts focused on 
numbers generated by a single set of accounting principles both before and 
after mandatory IFRS adoption. The second group is Multiple GAAP to IFRS 
that includes only analysts with portfolios consisting of firms following 
different local GAAPs prior to IFRS (for example, combination of French 
GAAP and German GAAP) and then the firms all switched to IFRS. We 
believe that for this subset of analysts comparability increases because these 
analysts focused on numbers generated by different accounting principles 
before mandatory IFRS adoption but only from one set of accounting 
standards after. The last group is Local GAAP to Multiple GAAP that includes 
analysts with portfolios including firms following a single local GAAP prior 
to IFRS and after mandatory IFRS some firms adopted IFRS and other firms 
continued to follow their local GAAP. We believe that for this subset of 
analysts comparability diminishes because these analysts focused on numbers 
generated from one set of accounting standards before mandatory IFRS 
adoption but from multiple sets of accounting standards after. To hold 
information effects relatively homogeneous across the three groups of firms 
we include in the analysis only forecasts made for mandatory adopters. We 
therefore exclude voluntary adopters since the incremental information 
benefits they would generate following mandatory adoption are likely to be 
lower than for firms implementing IFRS for the first time.10 




Moreover, to mitigate any selection bias that arises from analysts’ 
choice to change coverage we restrict the analysis to firms that an analyst 
covers both before and after mandatory IFRS adoption. Control variables used 
in equation (1) are also included and we incorporate additional variables to 
control for the individual analyst’s attributes, e.g. analyst’s experience, 
number of firms covered, number of industries covered, and the size of the 



















**   (2) 
Local GAAP to IFRS is an indicator variable and takes a value of one if the 
analyst’s portfolio only includes firms reporting under the same GAAP prior 
to IFRS and zero otherwise. Multiple GAAP to IFRS is an indicator variable 
and takes a value of one if the analyst’s portfolio only includes firms reporting 
under different GAAPs prior to IFRS and zero otherwise. 
3.2.2. Information Effects 
To investigate the potential information effects of IFRS adoption we focus on 
the analyst group Multiple GAAP to IFRS. However this time we use both the 
mandatory and the voluntary adopters. We expect that for this group of 
analysts comparability effects are present for both mandatory and voluntary 
adopters but information effects are stronger for mandatory adopters if IFRS 
increases transparency. If voluntary adopters improve their level of disclosure 
substantially (Dye [1986]) following mandatory IFRS adoption, then this 




introduces bias against the hypothesis. We also include all the control 
















Mandatory IFRS is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for firms 
that adopted IFRS after IFRS was mandated. Mandatory is an indicator 
variable that captures the period after mandatory IFRS adoption. 
3.3.  Manipulation Effects 
To examine whether earnings manipulation can explain the predicted increase 
in forecast accuracy we estimate a number of models. The first model tests 
whether, on average, forecast accuracy improves more for mandatory adopters 
that have large absolute accruals. Accruals provide managers with discretion 
and allow them to alter the inter-temporal pattern of profit (Healy [1985]). 
Second, we extend the model to test whether forecast accuracy improves more 
for mandatory adopters for whom analysts do not forecast cash flows. Firms 
for whom analysts issue cash flow forecasts exhibit lower levels of earnings 
management (DeFond and Hung [2003]; McInnis and Collins [2010]).  
Finally, we examine if firms that now have more accruals under IFRS 
are more likely to meet or just beat analyst forecasts . We employ the firm-
specific reconciliation adjustment, discussed in section 3.1. above, to capture 
the increased opportunities for firms to manipulate their earnings to meet 
analysts’ forecasts. If IFRS offers opportunities for firms to report larger 
accruals, relative to their local GAAP, then IFRS also provides greater 




opportunities for managers to manipulate their earnings (Healy et al. [1995]). 
This change in accruals afforded by IFRS is captured in the firm’s earnings 
reconciliation, e.g. large reconciliation adjustment firms have high discretion 
and small reconciliation adjustment firms have low discretion. If IFRS 
adopters with the greatest discretion are managing their earnings then we 
should observe a higher probability for these firms meeting or just beating 
analysts’ forecast after IFRS adoption.  
 
3. SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
3.1. Sample Selection 
The sample covers firms from all countries with I/B/E/S coverage and fiscal 
years ending on or after December 31, 2001, through December 31, 2007. We 
start by identifying all firms covered in I/B/E/S. We include only firms with 
I/B/E/S coverage both before and after IFRS adoption. To classify firms 
according to which accounting standards they are following we manually code 
each firm as adopting IFRS early (‘voluntary adopters’), adopting IFRS 
mandatorily (‘mandatory adopters’), or continuing to report under other 
GAAP after 2005 (‘non-adopters’), by reviewing their annual reports. The 
Worldscope classification suffers from many classification errors (Daske et al. 
[2008]) and therefore we do not use it.11 
This procedure yields in total 8,124 unique firms, of which 2,235 adopt 
IFRS for the first time mandatorily, and 635 firms had voluntarily adopted 
IFRS. Table 1 provides a break-down of the sample into the number of firms 




and observations by country and by the accounting standards followed. The 
majority of mandatory adopters come from Australia, France, Singapore, 
Sweden, Hong Kong and the UK. The majority of voluntary adopters are 
incorporated in Germany, Italy and Switzerland. The composition of the 
sample is broadly consistent with Daske et al. [2008]. 
 
3.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2, Panel A, reports summary statistics for the whole sample. For the 
average sample firm, the mean and median deflated (un-deflated) forecast 
errors are 0.334 (2.873) and 0.107 (0.140), respectively. Mean forecast 
dispersion, consensus, common precision, and idiosyncratic precision are 
0.148, 0.585, 113, and 191 respectively. We measure consensus, common 
precision, and idiosyncratic precision consistent with Barron et al. [2002]. 
Mean and median analyst coverage is 7.4 and 5 respectively. The forecast 
horizon is approximately 74 days.  
 Table 2, Panel B reports summary statistics by IFRS adoption type. 
Voluntary adopters are larger than mandatory adopters and have higher analyst 
coverage. The level of absolute accruals is similar across the two groups. 
Voluntary adopters report losses more frequently than mandatory adopters. 
Non-adopters are moderately larger and have the same analyst coverage as 
mandatory adopters. The level of absolute accruals is also very similar to the 
level of absolute accruals for mandatory and voluntary adopters. The same is 
true for non-adopters excluding US firms or including only firms from 




countries that mandated IFRS. Frequency of loss reporting for non-adopters is 
similar to frequency of loss reporting by mandatory adopters when US firms 
are excluded. 
4. RESULTS 
4.1. Effect of mandatory IFRS adoption 
4.1.1. Varying the sample 
Table 3 presents the estimated coefficients from the multivariate regressions 
for different samples. We find that forecast accuracy improves significantly 
after mandatory IFRS adoption for mandatory and voluntary adopters, relative 
to firms that do not adopt IFRS (column (1)). This improvement is significant 
at the 1% level for mandatory adopters and at the 10% for voluntary adopters. 
Column (2) excludes US firms to assess the robustness of the results when the 
control group does not include US firms. Forecast accuracy again improves for 
mandatory adopters, but accuracy for voluntary adopters does not significantly 
improve. Column (3) excludes forecasts made for 2005, the first year of 
mandatory IFRS adoption. For that year there was still little information 
generated from IFRS adoption, mainly in the form of companies’ 
presentations of the impact of IFRS and reconciliation reports between IFRS 
and local GAAP. Excluding forecasts made for the 2005 fiscal year, we find 
significant decrease in forecast errors both for mandatory and voluntary 
adopters. Column (4) excludes forecasts made for 2001 and 2002. For these 
two years, the economy was in a recession. In contrast, for all the other years 
in the sample the economy was growing. Therefore, eliminating forecasts for 




2001 and 2002 makes the periods before and after mandatory IFRS adoption 
more comparable in terms of economic conditions. Forecast accuracy 
improves for mandatory adopters, but accuracy for voluntary adopters does 
not significantly improve. Estimating the regression only on the countries that 
mandate IFRS produces similar results, with forecast accuracy improving only 
for mandatory adopters (column (5)). Finally, column (6) excludes firms from 
Singapore because Singapore was the only country that mandated IFRS before 
2005. Forecast accuracy improves significantly after mandatory IFRS 
adoption for mandatory adopters and marginally significant for voluntary 
IFRS adopters. The coefficient on Mandatory IFRS * Mandatory is 
statistically greater than the coefficient on Voluntary IFRS * Mandatory at the 
10% level in columns (1), (2), (4), and (6). This result suggests that the 
decrease in forecast errors is reliably greater for mandatory adopters relative to 
voluntary adopters under most specifications, although the level of statistical 
significance is moderate. In unreported tests we include an enforcement index 
however this does not alter our results. 
4.1.2. Varying the measurement of information environment 
Table 4 estimates the same model but uses different dependent variables. The 
first column uses the un-deflated absolute difference between forecast and 
actual earnings. We use this alternative dependent variable to ensure that the 
results are not driven by the choice of the deflator. We find that forecast 
accuracy improves significantly after mandatory IFRS adoption for mandatory 
and voluntary IFRS adopters relative to firms that do not adopt IFRS (column 




(1)). This improvement is significant at the 1% level for mandatory adopters 
and significant at the 10% for voluntary adopters. Column (2) uses as 
dependent variable forecast dispersion divided by absolute actual earnings. 
Forecast dispersion drops significantly for both mandatory and voluntary 
adopters. This result might reflect an increase in the consensus across analysts 
and/or increased precision in forecasting (Barron et al. [1998]). To disentangle 
those two effects we estimate the effect of IFRS reporting on analyst 
consensus (Barron et al. [2002]). Consensus decreases significantly for 
mandatory adopters relative to other firms (column (3)). This is contrary to the 
findings of Beuselinck et al. [2010] who find no change in the consensus.12 
Consensus remains unchanged relative to other firms for voluntary adopters. 
Idiosyncratic and common precision increase after mandatory IFRS adoption 
both for mandatory and voluntary adopters (columns (4) and (5)).13 The 
decrease in consensus for mandatory adopters can be explained by the higher 
increase in idiosyncratic precision compared to common precision.14 
4.1.3. Varying the forecast horizon 
Table 5 examines the robustness of the results to the choice of forecast 
horizon. The main results use forecasts with an average horizon of about 70 
days. Table 5 shows results using forecasts with horizon of 40, 100, 160 or 
220 days. Overall, we find that forecast accuracy improves significantly more 
for mandatory adopters relative to other firms. Across all specifications 
forecast accuracy improves more for mandatory adopters relative to non-
adopters and the estimated effect is significant at the 1% level. Forecast 




accuracy does not improve significantly more for voluntary adopters relative 
to non-adopters. The coefficient on Mandatory IFRS * Mandatory is 
statistically greater than the coefficient on Voluntary IFRS * Mandatory at the 
10% level in columns (1), (2), and (4). This result suggests that the decrease in 
forecast errors is reliably greater for mandatory adopters relative to voluntary 
adopters for most forecast horizons. 
In sum, we find that the information environment improves for 
mandatory adopters. Macroeconomic factors and not IFRS adoption can cause 
the decrease in forecast errors thereby casting doubt on whether IFRS causes 
the improvement in the information environment. However, these factors 
should affect the three groups of firms on average uniformly and therefore this 
argument fails to explain why we observe a higher improvement in 
transparency for mandatory adopters. Moreover, the inclusion of time-varying 
country, industry and firm factors should mitigate concerns that other 
unrelated events systematically vary with the IFRS adoption samples and 
cause different behavior in our information environment measures.  
 
4.2. Effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on information environment –
Firm-specific differences between IFRS and local GAAP 
If IFRS adoption has a direct effect on the information environment then 
forecast accuracy should be associated with the reconciliation amounts. Table 
6 confirms this prediction. The sample includes 1,389 unique firms from 18 
countries with available I/B/E/S and reconciliation data.15 The first two 




columns include all 1,389 firms. The last two columns exclude 427 UK firms, 
which populate heavily our sample, to ensure that the results are not driven 
only by UK firms. Columns (1) and (3) use raw values of the absolute deflated 
difference between Local GAAP and IFRS earnings. Columns (2) and (4) 
include rank values of this variable, ranging from one to five, assigned in 
quintiles. The interaction term GAAP Difference * Mandatory is negative and 
significant across all specifications and therefore forecast accuracy improves 
more for firms whose domestic accounting practice diverges more from IFRS. 
 
4.3. Mandatory IFRS adoption and information environment: comparability 
and/or information effects 
Table 7, Panel A provides summary statistics for the three groups of analysts 
and the firms that each group covers. Analysts with portfolios that move from 
Local to Multiple GAAP work in brokerage houses with on average 80 
analysts; follow a firm for a little over 3 years; cover 12 firms; and five 
industries.16 Average horizon of first (last) forecast is 163 (102) days. Analysts 
with portfolios that move from Local GAAP to IFRS work in brokerage houses 
with on average 54 analysts, follow a firm for a little over 3 years, cover 8 
firms, and four industries. Average horizon of first (last) forecast is 173 (86) 
days. Analysts with portfolios that move from Multiple GAAP to IFRS work in 
brokerage houses with on average 88 analysts, follow a firm for a little over 3 
years, cover 9 firms, and four industries. Average horizon of first (last) 
forecast is 171 (88) days. 




 Table 7, Panel B shows that consistent with a comparability effect, 
forecast accuracy improves more for analysts with portfolios that move from 
Local GAAP to IFRS and even more for analysts with portfolios that move 
from Multiple GAAP to IFRS. In the first (last) two columns, we use the first 
(last) forecast issued by each analyst within 250 days from fiscal year end. We 
use as dependent variable deflated and un-deflated absolute forecast errors. 
The coefficients on Local GAAP to IFRS * Mandatory and Multiple GAAP to 
IFRS * Mandatory are negative, and the latter is more negative than the 
former, across all specifications. Forecast accuracy of analysts, who benefit 
from accounting comparability, improves more. In unreported tests we 
examine whether the three groups of analysts differ substantially in terms of 
the covered firms’ country institutions (enforcement, legal institutions etc.) or 
reconciliation magnitudes. If mandatory adopters covered by analysts with 
portfolios that move from Multiple GAAP to IFRS are incorporated in 
countries with stronger legal institutions or have larger reconciliation amounts 
then the results might be caused by enforcement or reconciliation amounts 
rather than comparability. However, we do not find any systematic differences 
that could bias our results in either way, and when we include control 
variables for the quality of country institutions or reconciliation magnitudes all 
results remain unchanged. 
4.3.1. Information Effects 
Table 8, Panel A shows summary statistics for analysts with portfolios that 
move from Multiple GAAP to IFRS. These analysts work for brokerage houses 




that employ on average 83 analysts, have a little more of 3 years of firm-
specific experience, cover 9 firms, and 4 industries. The sample includes 719 
mandatory and 345 voluntary adopters. The sample of mandatory and 
voluntary adopters is comparable in terms of forecast horizon, reporting 
losses, firm size, and level of absolute accruals. 
Table 8, Panel B shows that consistent with an information effect, 
forecast accuracy improves more for mandatory than for voluntary adopters, 
for the set of analysts with portfolios that move from Multiple GAAP to IFRS. 
In the first (last) two columns, we use the first (last) forecast issued by each 
analysts within 250 days from fiscal year end. We use as dependent variable 
deflated and un-deflated absolute forecast errors. The coefficient on 
Mandatory IFRS * Mandatory is negative and significant.  
 
4.4. Are the findings a result of earnings management? 
Table 9 shows that the results are not likely to be the result of earnings 
management. The coefficient on the triple interaction term Mandatory IFRS * 
Mandatory * Absolute accruals is insignificant (Panel A, column (1)). A 
negative and significant coefficient would be consistent with an earnings 
management explanation. In unreported tests, we estimate discretionary 
accruals using the modified Jones model and we replace absolute accruals 
with absolute discretionary accruals in the regression. The results are similar 
to the ones reported above.  




The second column interacts the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption 
with the percentage of analysts that issue a cash flow forecast for the firm. For 
the median firm one out of three analysts with earnings forecasts issue also a 
cash flow forecast. The coefficient on the triple interaction term Mandatory 
IFRS * Mandatory * CF forecasts is insignificant (column (2)). A positive and 
significant coefficient would be consistent with an earnings management 
explanation.  
Table 9 Panel B shows that firms with larger absolute earnings 
reconciliations (i.e. those firms that have higher probability of greater earnings 
discretion following IFRS adoption) are no more likely to meet or beat the 
consensus earnings forecasts after mandatory IFRS adoption. For the 
manipulation hypothesis to be supported, the coefficient on the interaction 
term, GAAP Difference * Mandatory, needed to be positive and significant. 
Instead it is negative and insignificant.17 Collectively, the results do not 
support that the decrease in forecast errors is driven by managers manipulating 
earnings to bring them closer to consensus forecasts. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
We investigate whether mandatory IFRS adoption improves firms’ 
information environment. We find that, during the mandatory transition to 
IFRS, forecast accuracy and other measures of the quality of the information 
environment improve significantly more for mandatory adopters. Moreover, 
we find that the larger the difference between IFRS earnings and local GAAP 




earnings the larger is the improvement in forecast accuracy, increasing our 
confidence that it is IFRS adoption that causes the improvement in the 
information environment. 
We also provide evidence on whether the improvement in the 
information environment can be attributed to higher quality information and/or 
improved accounting comparability. We find results consistent with both 
information, and comparability effects. Forecast accuracy improves more for 
analyst-firm pairs that are affected by either information or comparability 
benefits. We do not find any evidence to suggest that the increase in forecast 
accuracy is driven by manipulation. 
We believe that these results have important implications for the debate on 
the globalization of accounting standards and for regulators that are 
considering a change to IFRS. Although we make no claim with regard to the 
net cost or benefit of adoption we do highlight that the effects of IFRS 
compliance are not homogeneous for all firms, even within the same country. 
Moreover, we note that IFRS adoption is likely to generate both information 
and comparability effects. 





                                                 
1
 Whether IFRS improves disclosure and lowers information asymmetry is debatable.  Leuz 
and Verrecchia [2000] examine German firms that adopted IAS or U.S. GAAP and find a 
decrease in spreads and an increase in turnover around adoption, compared to German GAAP 
firms. Cuijpers and Bujink [2005] do not find significant differences between local GAAP and 
IFRS firms in the EU. Daske [2006] examines voluntary IAS adoption by German firms and 
finds that IAS firms exhibit even higher cost of equity capital than local GAAP firms. Daske 
et al. [2008] find that, on average, market liquidity and equity valuations increase around the 
introduction of mandatory IFRS in a country. However, these market benefits exist only in 
countries with strict enforcement regimes and institutional environments that provide strong 
reporting incentives. 
2Switzerland is not a member of the EU and therefore is not subject to the EU IAS Regulation. 
The Swiss Foundation for Accounting and Reporting publishes accounting standards. 
Compliance with Swiss GAAP is required for all companies, however compliance with IFRS 
ensures compliance with Swiss GAAP and many large Swiss companies have, for a number of 
years, followed IASs/IFRS. However starting with annual reports for 2005 and interim reports 
for 2006, most Swiss companies whose equity shares are listed on the main board of the Swiss 
Exchange are required to prepare their financial statements using either IFRS or US GAAP. 
Swiss GAAP will no longer be permitted. 
3
 With respect to voluntary IFRS adopters Bae et al. (2008) finds for a sample of foreign 
analysts a negative relationship between GAAP differences and forecast accuracy, although 
this association is very sensitive to the model specifications. 
4
 Focusing on comparability with US rather than between IFRS countries Barth et al. [2009] 
find that efforts to converge accounting standards and the increasing mandatory use of IFRS 
have increased comparability of accounting amounts. Comparability is assessed in terms of 
value relevance and accounting system comparability. 
5
 The level of divergence could be capturing both increased information set and comparability 
benefits.  
6
 Following the findings of Cotter et al. 2010 we use absolute actual earnings rather than the 
conventional stock price as our deflator. Cotter et al. 2010 notes in their study that using share 
price as the deflator meant it was not possible to rule our confounding effects since they 
acknowledge that their sample period 2003 to 2007 included a period of high growth from 
2004-2006 followed by a serve decline from 2007 onwards. However, in unreported results 
we did use alternative deflators such as stock price and all the results were similar. We also 
find similar results if we do not deflate the forecast errors. Thus the choice of deflator does not 
appear to be driving the results. 
7
 Although Beuselinck et al. [2010] does find an association with changes in analysts’ 
precision of both public and private information following mandatory IFRS. 
8
 One limitation of this proxy is that, although we are able to capture the recognition and 
measurement differences within the reconciliation number, we are not able to capture 
disclosure differences e.g. segmental reporting disclosures pre and post, related party 
transaction pre and post etc. which will also be associated with the analysts variables.  
9
 We find similar results if we scale the reconciliation amount with the stock price at the 
previous fiscal year-end. 
10
 We do however acknowledge the voluntary adopters may improve their disclosure (Dye 
1986; 1990) but believe not at the same level to mandatory adopters. 
11
 Except for firms in countries that IFRS adoption is not allowed. 
12
 These results differ potentially because the sample in Beuselinck et al. [2010] is 
significantly smaller and the analysis does not control for time varying industry and country 
effects, and firm fixed effects. 
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13
 Readers should interpret the decomposition of consensus to common and idiosyncratic 
precision with care. As Barron et al. [1998] note the decomposition is valid if the following 
assumptions are satisfied: analysts issue unbiased forecasts, earnings forecast do not strictly 
determine earnings realizations, all analysts’ idiosyncratic information is of equal precision, 
and forecast errors are equally distributed. We believe it may well be the case that the third 
assumption does not hold in our setting. 
14
 We also rank transformed the idiosyncratic and common precision variables and estimated 
the effect of IFRS adoption on the ranking variables. The results were unchanged. 
15
 The sample includes firms from the following countries: Austria 2, Belgium 39, Czech 
Republic 1, Denmark 40, Finland 75, France 240, Greece 53, Ireland 27, Italy 109, 
Luxembourg 1, Netherlands 85, Norway 57, Poland 6, Portugal 16, Spain 79, Sweden 115, 
Switzerland 17, and UK 427. 
16
 32% of analysts are classified in this category. Analysts in this group cover on average more 
companies than other analysts, which makes it more likely that one of their firms won’t switch 
after mandatory adoption. Moreover, at the same time these analysts cover significantly 
smaller firms compared to other analysts and smaller firms in many jurisdictions switched to 
IFRS later on and not in 2005. 
17
 To control for the possibility that any cross-sectional variation we observe is due to the 
different levels of enforcement in unreported results we also include an enforcement proxy 
used in prior studies (Byard et al. [2009]; Preiato et al. [2009]; Cotter et al. [2010]). The 
results are not sensitive to this inclusion. 
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Sample composition by country and by accounting standard followed 
 
  All Mandatory IFRS Voluntary IFRS US GAAP 
Country Firm-years Unique firms Firm-years Unique firms Firm-years Unique firms Firm-years Unique firms 
ARGENTINA 15 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AUSTRALIA 1480 253 484 244 12 2 0 0 
AUSTRIA 175 32 20 7 131 25 13 5 
BELGIUM 382 69 121 49 88 19 7 3 
BERMUDA 86 16 0 0 14 2 71 14 
BRAZIL 552 91 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CANADA 2082 364 0 0 0 0 114 27 
CHILE 169 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CHINA 595 121 0 0 275 59 15 3 
CZECH REPUBLIC 30 5 3 2 21 3 0 0 
DENMARK 365 62 123 47 74 15 0 0 
EGYPT 31 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FINLAND 541 88 206 74 66 14 0 0 
FRANCE 1514 266 563 230 190 31 24 5 
GERMANY 1592 278 232 100 879 166 321 93 
GREECE 332 59 137 54 25 5 6 3 
HONG KONG 1073 189 482 181 46 8 12 3 
HUNGARY 62 10 2 1 58 9 0 0 
INDIA 603 117 0 0 0 0 6 2 
INDONESIA 295 49 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IRELAND 216 39 83 34 0 0 19 4 
ISRAEL 187 35 0 0 0 0 105 20 
ITALY 681 120 43 15 578 103 12 2 
JAPAN 5977 1032 0 0 0 0 258 47 
KOREA (SOUTH) 241 56 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LUXEMBOURG 52 9 6 2 22 5 19 4 
MALAYSIA 845 161 0 0 0 0 0 0 




MEXICO 308 49 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NETHERLANDS 701 113 252 95 55 9 77 17 
NEW ZEALAND 240 41 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NORWAY 440 77 197 74 10 2 28 8 
PERU 45 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PHILIPPINES 204 34 83 34 0 0 0 0 
POLAND 122 21 38 15 38 6 0 0 
PORTUGAL 162 25 57 21 18 4 0 0 
RUSSIA 93 20 0 0 45 10 40 9 
SINGAPORE 586 110 370 103 13 3 31 6 
SOUTH AFRICA 637 105 203 95 53 9 0 0 
SPAIN 515 83 220 80 0 0 2 1 
SWEDEN 770 129 335 125 17 3 7 1 
SWITZERLAND 903 146 66 25 593 100 81 16 
TAIWAN 582 111 0 0 0 0 4 1 
THAILAND 656 125 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TURKEY 293 54 0 0 100 21 0 0 
UNITED KINGDOM 3162 591 1158 528 7 2 16 4 
UNITED STATES 16617 2721 0 0 0 0 16617 2721 
TOTAL 47209 8124 5484 2235 3428 635 17905 3019 
 
This table shows the composition of the sample by country and by accounting standard. We refer to Hong Kong as a country in our analyses, although, more appropriately, it has 
the status of a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China. Voluntary IFRS includes firms that adopted IFRS before it was mandated in its country. 
Mandatory IFRS includes firms that adopt IFRS when their country mandated IFRS reporting. US GAAP includes firms reporting their primary financial statements under US 
GAAP. The sample includes only countries with at least 10 firm-year observations. 





Panel A: Summary statistics for variables used in regression analysis 
 
Dependent variables Mean STD Q3 Median Q1 
Error (deflated) 0.334 0.596 0.317 0.107 0.036 
Error (non-deflated) 2.873 7.959 0.940 0.140 0.040 
Dispersion 0.148 0.222 0.152 0.065 0.027 
Consensus 0.585 0.351 0.919 0.681 0.244 
Common precision 112.910 243.126 75.623 9.073 0.747 
Idiosyncratic precision 190.816 475.320 77.836 6.091 0.318 
Independent variables      
Absolute accruals 0.042 0.043 0.055 0.036 0.019 
Analyst coverage 7.397 6.484 10.000 5.000 3.000 
Firm size 8.108 2.808 9.864 7.684 6.064 
Loss 0.137 0.344 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Forecast horizon 73.576 2.081 75.000 73.000 72.000 
ADR 0.095 0.293 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Panel B: Summary statistics by type of IFRS adoption 
Mandatory adopters Mean STD Q3 Median Q1 
Absolute accruals 0.043 0.042 0.057 0.037 0.018 
Analyst coverage 7.370 6.659 10.000 5.000 2.000 
Firm size 7.358 2.340 8.879 7.159 5.662 
Loss 0.103 0.304 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Voluntary adopters      
Absolute accruals 0.046 0.037 0.060 0.041 0.024 
Analyst coverage 8.807 8.242 12.000 6.000 3.000 
Firm size 7.667 2.438 9.177 7.555 5.890 
Loss 0.141 0.348 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Non-adopters      
Absolute accruals 0.042 0.043 0.053 0.034 0.019 




Analyst coverage 7.237 6.140 10.000 5.000 3.000 
Firm size 8.070 2.954 10.429 7.653 6.291 
Loss 0.130 0.307 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Non-adopters (excl. US)      
Absolute accruals 0.042 0.039 0.053 0.035 0.020 
Analyst coverage 6.573 5.630 9.000 5.000 2.000 
Firm size 7.827 2.116 10.259 7.360 6.907 
Loss 0.122 0.327 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Non-adopters (from mandatory countries)      
Absolute accruals 0.047 0.040 0.058 0.038 0.023 
Analyst coverage 8.108 9.060 13.000 4.000 1.000 
Firm size 6.378 2.484 8.336 6.216 4.587 
Loss 0.214 0.410 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
Error (deflated) is the absolute difference between consensus forecast and actual earnings, divided by absolute actual earnings. Error (non-deflated) is the absolute difference 
between consensus forecast and actual earnings. Dispersion is the standard deviation of individual analyst forecasts for a firm i in year t divided by absolute actual earnings. 
Consensus is a measure of the commonality in analysts’ information, as captured by the across-analyst correlation in forecast errors (Barron, Byard and Kim [2002]). Common 
precision is a measure of the precision of common information in individual analyst forecasts (Barron, Byard and Kim [2002]). Idiosyncratic precision is a measure of the 
precision of idiosyncratic information in individual analyst forecasts (Barron, Byard and Kim [2002]). Absolute accruals is the absolute difference between net income and cash 
flows, divided by total assets. Analyst coverage is the number of analysts providing earnings forecasts for a firm. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Loss is an 
indicator variable if a firm is reporting negative net income. Forecast horizon is the number of days between consensus forecast and end of forecasting period. ADR is an indicator 










Effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on information environment – Varying the sample 
 
Sample All firms Ex US Ex 2005 Ex 2001-2002 Mandatory countries Ex Singapore 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable Error (deflated) 
Parameter Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t 
Intercept -0.4520 -5.02 -0.3011 -2.23 -0.5400 -5.45 -0.3880 -3.75 -0.3034 -1.73 -0.3996 -4.42 
Voluntary IFRS 0.0173 1.63 0.0095 0.86 0.0190 1.75 -0.0037 -0.25 -0.0093 -0.47 0.0168 1.58 
Mandatory IFRS 0.0520 8.81 0.0486 7.54 0.0557 7.96 0.0481 5.11 0.0285 1.78 0.0515 8.73 
Mandatory 0.0070 0.98 -0.0122 -1.13 0.0105 1.30 0.0000 -0.01 -0.0147 -0.75 0.0041 0.58 
Voluntary IFRS * Mandatory -0.0398 -1.86 -0.0227 -1.03 -0.0581 -2.52 -0.0062 -0.28 -0.0216 -0.75 -0.0404 -1.88 
Mandatory IFRS * Mandatory -0.0474 -4.32 -0.0343 -2.80 -0.0572 -4.44 -0.0357 -2.90 -0.0303 -1.99 -0.0494 -4.36 
Absolute accruals -0.2807 -6.74 -0.2875 -4.97 -0.2815 -6.07 -0.1622 -2.66 -0.3723 -4.49 -0.2737 -6.53 
US GAAP 0.0680 13.44 -0.0350 -2.95 0.0710 11.39 0.0728 10.46 -0.0570 -2.48 0.0676 13.40 
Analyst coverage -0.0010 -4.17 -0.0011 -3.40 -0.0011 -4.00 -0.0012 -3.57 -0.0013 -3.02 -0.0009 -4.07 
Firm size 0.0064 11.39 0.0054 8.62 0.0073 10.11 0.0065 6.95 0.0076 6.26 0.0063 11.30 
Loss 0.2997 26.96 0.3879 24.00 0.2942 25.03 0.3082 23.48 0.3556 16.01 0.2998 26.89 
Forecast horizon 0.0023 2.03 0.0005 0.27 0.0033 2.60 0.0014 1.11 0.0004 0.16 0.0017 1.45 
ADR -0.0174 -5.58 -0.0018 -0.48 -0.0076 -1.62 -0.0282 -3.82 -0.0025 -0.47 -0.0171 -5.39 
Industry-year benchmark 0.1064 3.93 0.0955 2.49 0.1206 4.07 0.1432 3.69 0.1755 3.28 0.1008 3.72 
Country-year benchmark 0.4542 21.12 0.4543 18.30 0.4470 19.38 0.4795 15.30 0.4305 12.22 0.4527 20.72 
Firm effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adj R-squared 38.8%  39.0%  38.8%  37.1%  40.1%  38.7%  
N 47,209  30,592  39,898  35,284  16,697  46,623  
 
This table presents OLS specifications testing the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on forecast errors. Each column uses a different sample. ‘All firms’ includes all firms 
tabulated in table 1. ‘Excl. US’ excludes all US firms. ‘Excl. 2005’ excludes all forecasts made for the fiscal year of 2005. ‘Excl. 2001-2002’ excludes all forecasts made for fiscal 
years 2001 and 2002. ‘Mandatory countries’ includes only forecasts made for firms that trade in countries that mandated IFRS. ‘Excl. Singapore’ excludes all firms from 
Singapore. Dependent variable is Error (deflated), which is the absolute difference between consensus forecast and actual earnings, divided by absolute actual earnings. Voluntary 
IFRS is an indicator variable for a firm that adopted IFRS before it was mandated in its country. Mandatory IFRS is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for a firm that 
adopts IFRS when its country mandated IFRS reporting. Mandatory is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for periods on or after 2005 (2003 for Singapore), or else 
zero. Absolute accruals is the absolute difference between net income and cash flows, divided by total assets. US GAAP is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm 
reports under US GAAP. Analyst coverage is the number of analysts providing earnings forecasts for a firm. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Loss is an indicator 
variable if a firm is reporting negative net income. Forecast horizon is the number of days between consensus forecast and end of forecasting period. ADR is an indicator variable 
if firm i in year t trades ADR in the US. Industry-year benchmark is the average level of the dependent variable by year for each of the 49 Fama-French [1996] industries. Country-
year benchmark is the average level of the dependent variable by year for each country. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm and year level. 





Effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on information environment – Varying the dependent variable 
 
Dependent variable Error (non-deflated) Dispersion Consensus Common precision Idiosyncratic precision 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Parameter Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t 
Intercept -2.4920 -3.68 -0.0767 -2.26 -0.6969 -11.37 21.1478 0.58 88.4537 1.17 
Voluntary IFRS 0.2464 4.03 0.0059 1.37 0.0066 1.13 -9.3317 -4.38 -8.6595 -1.96 
Mandatory IFRS 0.3498 7.78 0.0134 6.23 0.0204 6.06 -10.7950 -6.76 -19.4367 -5.90 
Mandatory 0.0527 0.85 -0.0055 -2.20 0.0140 3.28 -18.2047 -6.49 -26.5746 -4.56 
Voluntary IFRS * Mandatory -0.2306 -1.80 -0.0256 -2.96 0.0015 0.12 24.7885 5.37 21.4534 2.23 
Mandatory IFRS * Mandatory -0.2330 -2.49 -0.0129 -3.17 -0.0215 -2.98 19.0527 5.35 32.5467 4.39 
Absolute accruals -0.8379 -2.23 -0.1044 -6.80 0.0054 0.20 -4.7230 -0.43 -9.1444 -0.40 
US GAAP 0.1017 4.23 0.0310 15.87 -0.0284 -12.31 -12.8968 -10.76 -18.8442 -9.81 
Analyst coverage 0.0042 2.35 -0.0003 -2.80 -0.0008 -5.68 -0.3540 -4.48 -0.1634 -0.98 
Firm size 0.0573 10.58 0.0012 6.11 0.0012 4.34 -0.1178 -0.83 -0.4663 -1.56 
Loss 1.9249 20.85 0.0539 13.30 0.0632 16.76 -22.0241 -16.10 -37.4354 -14.64 
Forecast horizon 0.0172 1.97 -0.0003 -0.80 0.0030 3.72 -0.3275 -0.68 -1.3330 -1.32 
ADR -0.1179 -5.86 -0.0060 -5.23 0.0088 6.10 4.0532 6.90 4.5297 4.32 
Industry-year benchmark 0.1036 4.70 0.2033 9.72 0.2153 6.32 0.1234 9.23 0.1349 6.86 
Country-year benchmark 0.0340 8.18 0.4166 25.26 0.6057 21.87 0.1187 13.83 0.1103 11.55 
Firm effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adj R-squared 74.1%  44.4%  26.1%  53.6%  43.4%  
N 47,209  41,028  40,951  40,951  40,951  
 
This table presents OLS specifications testing the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on measures of information environment quality. Each column uses a different dependent 
variable. Error (non-deflated) is the absolute difference between consensus forecast and actual earnings. Dispersion is the standard deviation of individual analyst forecasts for a 
firm i in year t divided by absolute actual earnings. Consensus is a measure of the commonality in analysts’ information, as captured by the across-analyst correlation in forecast 
errors (Barron, Byard and Kim [2002]). Common precision is a measure of the precision of common information in individual analyst forecasts (Barron, Byard and Kim [2002]). 
Idiosyncratic precision is a measure of the precision of idiosyncratic information in individual analyst forecasts (Barron, Byard and Kim [2002]). Voluntary IFRS is an indicator 
variable for a firm that adopted IFRS before it was mandated in its country. Mandatory IFRS is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for a firm that adopts IFRS when its 
country mandated IFRS reporting. Mandatory is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for periods on or after 2005 (2003 for Singapore), or else zero. Absolute accruals 
is the absolute difference between net income and cash flows, divided by total assets. US GAAP is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm reports under US 
GAAP. Analyst coverage is the number of analysts providing earnings forecasts for a firm. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Loss is an indicator variable if a firm is 
reporting negative net income. Forecast horizon is the number of days between consensus forecast and fiscal year end. ADR is an indicator variable if firm i in year t trades ADR 




in the US. Industry-year benchmark is the average level of the dependent variable by year for each of the 49 Fama-French [1996] industries. Country-year benchmark is the 
average level of the dependent variable by year for each country. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm and year level. 





Effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on information environment – Varying the forecast horizon 
 
Sample Horizon 40 days Horizon 100 days Horizon 160 days Horizon 220 days 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable Error (deflated) 
Parameter Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t 
Intercept -0.1801 -4.22 -0.3630 -4.59 -0.6696 -5.65 -0.8941 -6.05 
Voluntary IFRS 0.0059 0.58 0.0048 0.43 0.0203 1.59 0.0456 3.02 
Mandatory IFRS 0.0403 7.24 0.0467 7.38 0.0574 7.93 0.0781 9.24 
Mandatory 0.0030 0.50 0.0022 0.32 0.0012 0.17 0.0070 0.92 
Voluntary IFRS * Mandatory -0.0377 -1.83 -0.0332 -1.48 -0.0366 -1.43 -0.0121 -0.42 
Mandatory IFRS * Mandatory -0.0508 -4.73 -0.0500 -4.21 -0.0389 -2.94 -0.0433 -2.90 
Absolute accruals -0.2380 -6.48 -0.2953 -6.97 -0.3741 -7.41 -0.3086 -5.45 
US GAAP 0.0715 14.16 0.0645 12.25 0.0671 11.39 0.0804 12.66 
Analyst coverage -0.0010 -4.74 -0.0009 -3.51 -0.0002 -0.86 0.0002 0.55 
Firm size 0.0057 11.53 0.0079 13.10 0.0070 10.03 0.0063 7.91 
Loss 0.2539 25.43 0.3121 26.55 0.3758 28.49 0.3985 28.02 
Forecast horizon -0.0016 -1.58 0.0004 0.55 0.0017 2.48 0.0020 3.08 
ADR -0.0184 -6.34 -0.0199 -5.92 -0.0217 -5.56 -0.0283 -6.78 
Industry-year benchmark 0.1192 4.27 0.1460 5.78 0.1560 7.11 0.1541 6.75 
Country-year benchmark 0.4528 21.50 0.4685 21.12 0.4982 21.25 0.5619 22.93 
Firm effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adj R-squared 38.4%  39.8%  41.5%  42.6%  
N 48,067  45,301  43,069  38,893  
 
This table presents OLS specifications testing the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on forecast errors. Each column uses forecasts of different horizons. ‘Horizon 40 days’ 
includes forecasts on average 40 days away from the end of the fiscal period. ‘Horizon 100 days’ includes forecasts on average 100 days away from the end of the fiscal period. 
‘Horizon 160 days’ includes forecasts on average 160 days away from the end of the fiscal period. ‘Horizon 220 days’ includes forecasts on average 220 days away from the end 
of the fiscal period. Dependent variable is Error (deflated), which is the absolute difference between consensus forecast and actual earnings, divided by absolute actual earnings. 
Voluntary IFRS is an indicator variable for a firm that adopted IFRS before it was mandated in its country. Mandatory IFRS is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for a 
firm that adopts IFRS when its country mandated IFRS reporting. Mandatory is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for periods on or after 2005 (2003 for Singapore), 
or else zero. Absolute accruals is the absolute difference between net income and cash flows, divided by total assets. US GAAP is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if 
a firm reports under US GAAP. Analyst coverage is the number of analysts providing earnings forecasts for a firm. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Loss is an 
indicator variable if a firm is reporting negative net income. Forecast horizon is the number of days between consensus forecast and fiscal year end. ADR is an indicator variable if 




firm i in year t trades ADR in the US. Industry-year benchmark is the average level of the dependent variable by year for each of the 49 Fama-French [1996] industries. Country-
year benchmark is the average level of the dependent variable by year for each country. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm and year level. 





Effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on information environment –Firm-specific differences between IFRS and local GAAP 
 
Sample Mandatory adopters Mandatory adopters excl. UK 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable Error (deflated) 
Parameter Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t 
Intercept -0.3119 -1.30 -0.3274 -1.36 0.4527 1.24 0.4354 1.19 
Mandatory -0.0288 -1.51 0.0739 2.32 -0.0500 -1.99 0.0419 1.11 
GAAP Difference 0.0091 3.15 0.0237 4.84 0.0095 2.71 0.0211 3.66 
GAAP Difference * Mandatory -0.0133 -2.19 -0.0413 -4.36 -0.0130 -1.98 -0.0375 -3.26 
Absolute accruals -0.2530 -2.05 -0.2825 -2.35 -0.4311 -3.08 -0.4472 -3.23 
US GAAP -0.1987 -2.98 -0.1836 -2.80 -0.1904 -2.83 -0.1781 -2.69 
Analyst coverage -0.0021 -3.01 -0.0019 -2.78 -0.0009 -1.25 -0.0007 -0.99 
Firm size 0.0065 3.14 0.0060 2.91 0.0031 1.49 0.0027 1.27 
Loss 0.3487 11.05 0.3459 10.99 0.3644 10.38 0.3610 10.27 
Forecast horizon 0.0008 0.25 0.0003 0.10 -0.0091 -1.96 -0.0095 -2.03 
ADR 0.0092 1.16 0.0078 0.99 0.0037 0.39 0.0019 0.20 
Industry-year benchmark 0.1782 2.41 0.1773 2.40 0.1233 1.39 0.1254 1.42 
Country-year benchmark 0.4420 7.98 0.4329 7.86 0.4563 7.75 0.4447 7.60 
Firm effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adj R-squared 41.2%  41.3%  42.7%  42.7%  
N 8,168  8,168  5,709  5,709  
 
This table presents OLS specifications testing the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on forecast errors. ‘Mandatory adopters’ includes all firms that are mandatory adopters of 
IFRS with available IFRS reconciliation and IBES data. ‘Mandatory adopter’s excl. UK’ includes all firms that are mandatory adopters of IFRS with available IFRS reconciliation 
and IBES data outside the UK. The first and third column use raw values of GAAP difference. The second and third column use rank values (ranging from one to five) of GAAP 
difference. Dependent variable is Error (deflated), which is the absolute difference between consensus forecast and actual earnings, divided by absolute actual earnings. Mandatory 
is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for periods on or after 2005, or else zero. GAAP difference is the absolute difference between IFRS earnings and local GAAP 
earnings, as published in the reconciliation documents of first time adopters in 2005, divided by the absolute local GAAP earnings. Absolute accruals is the absolute difference 
between net income and cash flows, divided by total assets. US GAAP is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm reports under US GAAP. Analyst coverage is the 
number of analysts providing earnings forecasts for a firm. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Loss is an indicator variable if a firm is reporting negative net income. 
Forecast horizon is the number of days between consensus forecast and fiscal year end. ADR is an indicator variable if firm i in year t trades ADR in the US. Industry-year 
benchmark is the average level of the dependent variable by year for each of the 49 Fama-French [1996] industries. Country-year benchmark is the average level of the dependent 
variable by year for each country. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm and year level. 





Panel A: Summary statistics by analyst classification 
 
Analyst group From Local to Multiple GAAP From Local GAAP to IFRS From Multiple GAAP to IFRS 
# of observations 8152 2874 9538 
# of unique firms 1009 384 719 
# of unique analysts 426 197 706 
Statistic Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD 
Error (deflated) -(First forecast) 0.406 1.196 0.484 1.327 0.495 1.389 
Error (non-deflated) - (First forecast) 2.784 13.008 2.765 13.346 2.272 18.110 
Error (deflated) - (Last forecast) 0.339 1.090 0.381 1.161 0.427 1.316 
Error (non-deflated) - (Last forecast) 2.460 13.117 2.560 13.275 2.166 18.313 
Brokerage house size 79.724 89.655 53.781 67.617 87.895 85.747 
Experience 3.280 1.771 3.351 1.820 3.362 1.786 
# of firms covered 12.142 6.907 8.261 4.056 8.711 3.959 
# of industries covered 4.865 3.297 3.884 2.697 3.584 2.527 
Forecast horizon (First forecast) 163.619 54.298 173.888 57.453 171.348 57.853 
Forecast horizon (Last forecast) 101.904 49.598 86.132 49.969 87.767 51.740 
Loss 0.052 0.223 0.045 0.208 0.074 0.262 
Firm size 7.272 2.189 9.111 2.347 9.024 2.457 
Absolute accruals 0.041 0.038 0.037 0.037 0.045 0.037 
 
 
Panel A presents summary statistics for three groups of analysts. ‘From Local to Multiple GAAP’ includes analysts, whose portfolios had firms following a single GAAP and after 
mandatory IFRS adoption some firms in their portfolio follow IFRS and other firms Local or US GAAP.  ‘From Local GAAP to IFRS’ includes analysts, whose portfolios had 
firms following a single GAAP and after mandatory IFRS adoption all firms in their portfolio follow IFRS. ‘From Multiple GAAP to IFRS’ includes analysts, whose portfolios had 
firms following different GAAP and after mandatory IFRS adoption all firms in their portfolio follow IFRS. The sample includes only mandatory IFRS adopters. A firm-analyst 
pair is included in the sample only if it appears both before and after mandatory IFRS adoption. ‘First forecast’ uses the first forecast made by an analyst for a firm within 240 days 
(but not less than 30 days) from the end of the fiscal year. ‘Last forecast’ uses the last forecast made by an analyst for a firm within 240 days (but not less than 30 days) from the 
end of the fiscal year. Error (deflated) is the absolute difference between consensus forecast and actual earnings, divided by absolute actual earnings. Error (non-deflated) is the 
absolute difference between consensus forecast and actual earnings. Brokerage house size is the number of analysts working for the brokerage house of the focal analyst. 
Experience is the number of years the analyst has been following a firm. # of firms covered is the number of firms an analyst is covering in a year. # of industries covered is the 
number of industries an analyst is covering in a year, based on the Fama-French industry classification. Forecast horizon is the number of days between consensus forecast and 
fiscal year end. Loss is an indicator variable if a firm is reporting negative net income. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Absolute accruals is the absolute difference 
between net income and cash flows, divided by total assets. 




Panel B: Mandatory IFRS adoption and information environment: effect of accounting comparability 
 
Sample First forecast Last forecast 
Dependent variable Error (deflated) Error (non-deflated) Error (deflated) Error (non-deflated) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Parameter Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t 
Intercept -0.6776 -3.55 -6.9735 -3.26 -0.7122 -3.32 -6.4635 -2.92 
Local GAAP to IFRS 0.1174 1.67 1.7905 2.52 0.0580 0.84 1.9157 2.55 
Multiple GAAP to IFRS 0.1594 1.91 2.9558 2.59 0.1524 1.79 3.1900 2.64 
Mandatory 0.2127 3.69 2.8673 3.16 0.2535 3.37 3.2846 3.02 
Local GAAP to IFRS * Mandatory -0.1104 -1.45 -1.2665 -2.09 -0.0807 -1.26 -1.5294 -2.25 
Multiple GAAP to IFRS * Mandatory -0.1798 -1.92 -3.2341 -3.32 -0.1713 -1.74 -3.4268 -3.36 
Forecast horizon 0.0008 5.55 0.0035 2.02 0.0005 2.37 -0.0017 -0.80 
Brokerage house size -0.0003 -2.85 -0.0044 -2.27 -0.0003 -2.77 -0.0046 -2.30 
Experience 0.0003 0.03 -0.0056 -0.04 0.0023 0.31 -0.0245 -0.17 
# of firms covered 0.0010 0.39 -0.0945 -1.73 0.0001 0.05 -0.1123 -1.92 
# of industries covered -0.0033 -0.56 0.1832 2.00 -0.0026 -0.52 0.1898 1.97 
Loss 1.2160 9.48 3.8639 3.30 0.9349 8.67 3.6152 2.91 
Firm size -0.0027 -0.27 0.3140 1.90 0.0059 0.60 0.3185 1.86 
Absolute accruals -0.2979 -0.66 6.6745 0.90 -0.0985 -0.24 7.4445 0.98 
Industry-year benchmark 0.8273 5.00 0.0191 1.42 1.0935 4.78 0.0231 1.41 
Country-year benchmark 0.8573 4.52 1.3058 4.92 0.9431 3.85 1.4098 4.48 
Adj R-squared 11.2%  13.8%  9.8%  12.6%  
N 20,564  20,564  20,564  20,564  
Panel B presents OLS specifications testing the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on forecast errors for three groups of analysts. ‘From Local GAAP to IFRS’ includes analysts, 
whose portfolios had firms following a single GAAP and after mandatory IFRS adoption all firms in their portfolio follow IFRS. ‘From Multiple GAAP to IFRS’ includes analysts, 
whose portfolios had firms following different GAAP and after mandatory IFRS adoption all firms in their portfolio follow IFRS. ‘From Local to Multiple GAAP’ includes 
analysts, whose portfolios had firms following a single GAAP and after mandatory IFRS adoption some firms in their portfolio follow IFRS and other firms Local or US GAAP 
(omitted group). The sample includes only mandatory IFRS adopters. A firm-analyst pair is included in the sample only if it appears both before and after mandatory IFRS 
adoption. ‘First forecast’ uses the first forecast made by an analyst for a firm within 240 days (but not less than 30 days) from the end of the fiscal year. ‘Last forecast’ uses the last 
forecast made by an analyst for a firm within 240 days (but not less than 30 days) from the end of the fiscal year. Error (deflated) is the absolute difference between consensus 
forecast and actual earnings, divided by absolute actual earnings. Error (non-deflated) is the absolute difference between consensus forecast and actual earnings. Forecast horizon 
is the number of days between consensus forecast and fiscal year end. Brokerage house size is the number of analysts working for the brokerage house of the focal analyst. 
Experience is the number of years the analyst has been following a firm. # of firms covered is the number of firms an analyst is covering in a year. # of industries covered is the 
number of industries an analyst is covering in a year, based on the Fama-French industry classification. Loss is an indicator variable if a firm is reporting negative net income. Firm 
size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Absolute accruals is the absolute difference between net income and cash flows, divided by total assets. Industry-year benchmark is the 
average level of the dependent variable by year for each of the 49 Fama-French [1996] industries. Country-year benchmark is the average level of the dependent variable by year 
for each country. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. 





Panel A: Summary statistics by firm classification for analyst portfolios that change 
from Multiple GAAP to IFRS 
 
Analyst group  From Multiple GAAP to IFRS  
# of observations  14147  
# of unique firms  1064  
# of unique analysts  776  
Statistic  Mean STD  
Brokerage house size  83.44 83.65  
Experience  3.35 1.78  
# of firms covered  8.68 4.04  
# of industries covered  3.66 2.50  
Firm group Mandatory adopters Voluntary adopters 
# of observations 9538 4609 
# of unique firms 719 345 
Statistic Mean STD Mean STD 
Error (deflated) -(First forecast) 0.495 1.389 0.431 1.054 
Error (non-deflated) - (First forecast) 2.272 18.111 2.345 22.340 
Error (deflated) - (Last forecast) 0.427 1.316 0.345 0.942 
Error (non-deflated) - (Last forecast) 2.166 18.313 1.849 18.594 
Forecast horizon (First forecast) 171.348 57.853 169.576 58.359 
Forecast horizon (Last forecast) 87.768 51.748 86.206 53.001 
Loss 0.074 0.262 0.069 0.254 
Firm size 9.024 2.457 8.825 2.089 
Absolute accruals 0.045 0.037 0.043 0.028 
 
Panel A presents summary statistics. ‘From Multiple GAAP to IFRS’ includes analysts, whose portfolios had firms following 
different GAAP and after mandatory IFRS adoption all firms in their portfolio follow IFRS. The sample includes voluntary 
and mandatory IFRS adopters. A firm-analyst pair is included in the sample only if it appears both before and after mandatory 
IFRS adoption. ‘First forecast’ uses the first forecast made by an analyst for a firm within 240 days (but not less than 30 days) 
from the end of the fiscal year. ‘Last forecast’ uses the last forecast made by an analyst for a firm within 240 days (but not 
less than 30 days) from the end of the fiscal year. Error (deflated) is the absolute difference between consensus forecast and 
actual earnings, divided by absolute actual earnings. Error (non-deflated) is the absolute difference between consensus 
forecast and actual earnings. Brokerage house size is the number of analysts working for the brokerage house of the focal 
analyst. Experience is the number of years the analyst has been following a firm. # of firms covered is the number of firms an 
analyst is covering in a year. # of industries covered is the number of industries an analyst is covering in a year, based on the 
Fama-French industry classification. Forecast horizon is the number of days between consensus forecast and fiscal year end. 
Loss is an indicator variable if a firm is reporting negative net income. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. 
Absolute accruals is the absolute difference between net income and cash flows, divided by total assets. 
 




Panel B: Mandatory IFRS adoption and information environment: information effect  
 
Sample First forecast Last forecast 
Dependent variable Error (deflated) Error (non-deflated) Error (deflated) Error (non-deflated) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Parameter Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t 
Intercept -0.3912 -1.61 -3.4213 -1.41 -0.5183 -1.89 -3.1698 -1.35 
Mandatory IFRS 0.1916 2.02 1.7946 1.83 0.1874 2.08 1.9063 2.04 
Mandatory 0.1791 2.52 1.0633 1.86 0.2352 2.72 0.9659 1.58 
Mandatory IFRS * Mandatory -0.2079 -2.00 -1.5136 -1.92 -0.1912 -1.98 -1.3139 -1.74 
Forecast horizon 0.0006 3.47 0.0022 1.11 0.0004 2.07 0.0036 1.16 
Brokerage house size -0.0004 -2.51 -0.0040 -1.41 -0.0004 -3.05 -0.0040 -1.48 
Experience 0.0103 0.94 -0.0838 -0.43 0.0119 1.17 -0.1079 -0.51 
# of firms covered -0.0006 -0.14 0.0096 0.21 -0.0011 -0.28 -0.0095 -0.27 
# of industries covered -0.0018 -0.21 -0.0263 -0.57 -0.0041 -0.57 -0.0133 -0.27 
Loss 1.0731 8.32 2.2888 2.27 0.7142 6.83 1.7080 1.70 
Firm size -0.0160 -1.34 0.1886 0.81 -0.0095 -0.86 0.1515 0.64 
Absolute accruals -0.3251 -0.51 10.6378 0.75 0.2705 0.45 10.1576 0.76 
Industry-year benchmark 0.3986 2.84 -0.0039 -0.19 0.6357 3.31 0.0105 0.45 
Country-year benchmark 0.9893 3.82 1.0461 2.87 1.1755 3.07 1.1003 3.50 
Adj R-squared 10.4%  26.8%  8.3%  23.5%  
N 14,147  14,147  14,147  14,147  
Panel B presents OLS specifications testing the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on forecast errors for two groups of firms. 
‘From Multiple GAAP to IFRS’ includes analysts, whose portfolios had firms following different GAAP and after mandatory 
IFRS adoption all firms in their portfolio follow IFRS. The sample includes only voluntary and mandatory IFRS adopters. A 
firm-analyst pair is included in the sample only if it appears both before and after mandatory IFRS adoption. Error (deflated) 
is the absolute difference between consensus forecast and actual earnings, divided by absolute actual earnings. ‘First forecast’ 
uses the first forecast made by an analyst for a firm within 240 days (but not less than 30 days) from the end of the fiscal year. 
‘Last forecast’ uses the last forecast made by an analyst for a firm within 240 days (but not less than 30 days) from the end of 
the fiscal year. Error (non-deflated) is the absolute difference between consensus forecast and actual earnings. Forecast 
horizon is the number of days between consensus forecast and fiscal year end. Brokerage house size is the number of analysts 
working for the brokerage house of the focal analyst. Experience is the number of years the analyst has been following a firm. 
# of firms covered is the number of firms an analyst is covering in a year. # of industries covered is the number of industries 
an analyst is covering in a year, based on the Fama-French industry classification. Loss is an indicator variable if a firm is 
reporting negative net income. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Absolute accruals is the absolute difference 
between net income and cash flows, divided by total assets. Industry-year benchmark is the average level of the dependent 
variable by year for each of the 49 Fama-French [1996] industries. Country-year benchmark is the average level of the 
dependent variable by year for each country. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. 





Panel A: Effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on forecast errors and earnings 
management 
 
Dependent variable Error (deflated) 
  (1) (2) 
Parameter Estimate t Estimate t 
Intercept -0.4520 -5.02 -0.4526 -5.03 
Voluntary IFRS 0.0173 1.63 0.0168 1.57 
Mandatory IFRS 0.0520 8.81 0.0512 8.49 
Mandatory 0.0070 0.98 0.0069 0.96 
Voluntary IFRS * Mandatory -0.0384 -1.44 -0.0161 -0.69 
Mandatory IFRS * Mandatory -0.0474 -3.70 -0.0392 -3.16 
Absolute accruals -0.2799 -6.19 -0.2810 -6.73 
Voluntary IFRS * Mandatory*Absolute accruals -0.0373 -0.11   
Mandatory IFRS * Mandatory*Absolute accruals 0.0001 0.00   
CF forecasts   0.0020 0.63 
Voluntary IFRS * Mandatory*CF forecasts   -0.0240 -2.09 
Mandatory IFRS * Mandatory*CF forecasts   -0.0073 -1.17 
US GAAP 0.0680 13.44 0.0693 13.16 
Analyst coverage -0.0010 -4.17 -0.0010 -4.49 
Firm size 0.0064 11.38 0.0064 11.46 
Loss 0.2997 26.95 0.3000 26.97 
Forecast horizon 0.0023 2.03 0.0023 2.02 
ADR -0.0174 -5.57 -0.0177 -5.65 
Industry-year benchmark 0.1064 3.93 0.1058 3.91 
Country-year benchmark 0.4542 21.12 0.4552 21.18 
Firm effects Yes  Yes  
Adj R-squared 38.8%  38.8%  
N 47,209  47,209  
 
This table presents OLS specifications testing the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on forecast errors conditional on 
earnings management variables. Dependent variable is Error (deflated), which is the absolute difference between consensus 
forecast and actual earnings, divided by absolute actual earnings. Voluntary IFRS is an indicator variable for a firm that 
adopted IFRS before it was mandated in its country. Mandatory IFRS is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for a 
firm that adopts IFRS when its country mandated IFRS reporting. Mandatory is an indicator variable that takes the value of 
one for periods on or after 2005 (2003 for Singapore), or else zero. Absolute accruals is the absolute difference between net 
income and cash flows, divided by total assets. CF forecasts is the number of analysts that forecast cash flow per share 
divided by the number of analyst that forecast earnings per share. US GAAP is an indicator variable that takes the value of one 
if a firm reports under US GAAP. Analyst coverage is the number of analysts providing earnings forecasts for a firm. Firm 
size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Loss is an indicator variable if a firm is reporting negative net income. Forecast 
horizon is the number of days between consensus forecast and fiscal year end. ADR is an indicator variable if firm i in year t 
trades ADR in the US. Industry-year benchmark is the average level of the dependent variable by year for each of the 49 
Fama-French [1996] industries. Country-year benchmark is the average level of the dependent variable by year for each 
country. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm and year level. 





Panel B: Effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on the probability of meeting or beating analyst forecasts. 
Sample Mandatory adopters Mandatory adopters excl. UK 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable Error (deflated) 
Parameter Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept 4.3101 0.064 4.4395 0.026 4.6361 0.191 5.7823 0.059 
Mandatory -0.4728 0.011 -0.4263 0.007 -0.4833 0.054 -0.4775 0.026 
GAAP Difference 0.0316 0.156 0.0386 0.048 0.0358 0.122 0.0422 0.044 
GAAP Difference * Mandatory -0.0458 0.126 -0.0284 0.261 -0.0486 0.114 -0.0386 0.148 
Absolute accruals -3.5092 0.122 -1.6658 0.376 -4.9180 0.048 -2.2782 0.239 
US GAAP 1.3936 0.149 0.9621 0.331 0.6045 0.569 0.1245 0.909 
Analyst coverage 0.0601 <.0001 0.0626 <.0001 0.0398 0.004 0.0433 0.000 
Firm size -0.2521 <.0001 -0.2574 <.0001 -0.3011 <.0001 -0.3245 <.0001 
Loss -0.5858 0.021 -0.9536 <.0001 -0.4487 0.073 -0.8386 0.000 
Forecast horizon -0.0615 0.029 -0.0555 0.022 -0.0494 0.257 -0.0550 0.144 
ADR 0.0200 0.942 0.0210 0.924 0.5296 0.064 0.5678 0.012 
Industry-year benchmark 3.2784 <.0001 3.6022 <.0001 2.4881 0.012 -2.9143 0.000 
Country-year benchmark 0.8596 0.215 0.8486 0.134 -0.2004 0.761 -0.2110 0.690 
Firm effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adj. R-squared 4.07%  5.21%  6.67%  7.91%  
N 8,168   8,168   5,709   5,709   
This table presents a logistic specification testing the likelihood of meeting or beating analyst forecasts following mandatory adoption of IFRS. The dependent variable takes the 
value of one if the realized earnings are equal to or within a one per cent per share of the analyst’s forecast (first and third column). As a sensitivity analysis we also present results 
where the dependent variable takes the value of one if realized earnings are equal to forecasted earnings or within a three per cent of the analyst’s forecast (second and fourth 
column).‘Mandatory adopters’ includes all firms that are mandatory adopters of IFRS with available IFRS reconciliation and IBES data. ‘Mandatory adopter’s excl. UK’ includes 
all firms that are mandatory adopters of IFRS with available IFRS reconciliation and IBES data outside the UK. GAAP difference is the absolute difference between IFRS earnings 
and local GAAP earnings, as published in the reconciliation documents of first time adopters in 2005, divided by the absolute local GAAP earnings. Absolute accruals are the 
absolute difference between net income and cash flows, divided by total assets. US GAAP is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm reports under US GAAP. 
Analyst coverage is the number of analysts providing earnings forecasts for a firm. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Loss is an indicator variable if a firm is 
reporting negative net income. Forecast horizon is the number of days between consensus forecast and fiscal year end. ADR is an indicator variable if firm i in year t trades ADR 
in the US. Industry-year benchmark is the average level of the dependent variable by year for each of the 49 Fama-French [1996] industries. Country-year benchmark is the 
average level of the dependent variable by year for each country. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm and year level. 
